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Recent Decisions
Bankruptcy Act - Creditor Can Obtain Review Of Ref-
eree's Decision On Trustee's Objection Where Trustee Fails
To Seek Review. In re Madway, 179 F. Supp. 400 (D.C. Pa.
1959). The Federal District Court, in affirming the ref-
eree's decision to discharge bankrupt, approved an indi-
vidual creditor's right to have the referee's decision re-
viewed when the trustee failed to appeal. The referee had
discharged the voluntary bankrupts from their debts and
the trustee filed objections on the grounds that the bank-
rupts had failed to explain satisfactorily their loss of assets,
11 U.S.C.A. (1953) Sec. 32 (c) (7). A hearing was held
and the referee affirmed the discharge. A Certificate of
Review was taken by a creditor to the District Court,
seeking reversal of the referee's decision. The Court held
that although the Bankruptcy Act authorizes a trustee to
object, 11 U.S.C.A. (1953) Sec. 32 (b), this does not take
away the right of an individual creditor independently to
oppose the discharge before the referee or to obtain a Cer-
tificate of Review. Although there has been no case specifi-
cally granting review to a creditor where only the trustee
had protested originally and failed to appeal, this Court
construed the trustee's power of objection as not intending
to limit the jurisdiction of the District Court, but rather to
provide a means for speedy review in addition to the
creditor's right.
In similar circumstances the Courts have reviewed
charges of fraud made by a petitioning creditor. In In re
Fergus Falls Woolen Mills Co., 41 F. Supp. 355, 359 (D.C.
Minn., 1941), the Court said:
"Where the trustee fails to contest doubtful claims, or
apparently invalid claims, the creditors are not com-
pelled to sit idly by and do nothing about it. It is the
privilege and right of creditors who have filed claims
in the proceeding to petition the Court for a review
of a referee's order, where it is apparent that there is
grave question as to the validity of such order, and
the creditors may do this, even though no request has
been made upon the trustee to do so."
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th Ed., 1959 Supp.) Sec. 39.19
cites the Fergus Falls case, and maintains that it is contra
better authority.
RECENT DECISIONS
Conflict Of Laws - Effect Of Foreign Ex Parte Divorce
On Prior Maryland Separation Alimony Decree. Gregg
v. Gregg, 220 Md. 578, 155 A. 2d 500 (1959). Wife obtained
a judicial separation in Maryland in 1951, and husband
was ordered to pay $38 per month permanent alimony. In
wife's instant suit to recover accrued alimony, husband
contended he was under no duty to pay until a divorce
ex parte obtained by him in Nevada in 1953 was declared
invalid. The Maryland Court of Appeals, after finding the
Nevada divorce decree invalid due to the lack of juris-
diction over husband, held that defendant was liable for
past alimony and declared him to be in contempt of the
1951 alimony order.
In Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 114 A. 2d 53
(1954), the Maryland Court of Appeals allowed a wife to
recover for past due alimony after finding an Arkansas
a vinculo divorce decree obtained ex parte by husband
to be invalid due to lack of jurisdiction of the Arkansas
court. The Court stated that a Maryland court may in-
quire into the question of domicile where the recognition of
a foreign divorce, obtained without personal appearance
of the adverse party, is involved. Maryland courts will
recognize ex parte divorces obtained in foreign courts
where the plaintiff's spouse has complied with the domicile
requirements of the other state, but such foreign decree
will be subject to collateral attack in Maryland if the
former court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff.
It would appear from the language of the Court that if
the Nevada decree had been valid, the husband would not
have been in contempt of the Maryland alimony decree.
In Johnson v. Johnson, 202 Md. 547, 97 A. 2d 330 (1952),
certiorari denied 346 U. S. 874 (1952), a divorce a vinculo
obtained by the husband in Florida, in which wife ap-
peared, ended husband's duty to pay alimony under a
Maryland decree a mensa granted to wife prior to the
Florida divorce. For further discussion, see Note, And Now
That You Have Your Divorce, Where Do You Stand? 10
Md. L. Rev. 256 (1949).
Criminal Law - Involuntary Manslaughter Conviction
Affirmed Against Joy Racer. Commonwealth v:. Root, 156
A. 2d 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959). Defendant's conviction
of involuntary manslaughter by automobile arose out
of a race between defendant and decedent where de-
cedent, in trying to pass defendant, collided head-on with a
truck. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in affirming
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the conviction, held that defendant's racing was the proxi-
mate cause of decedent's death despite the absence of con-
tact between the defendant's car and either of the colliding
vehicles. Regardless of decedent's own recklessness, if the
defendant's act was one of the substantial causes of de-
cedent's death the defendant would be guilty
In State v. Fair, 209 S.C. 439, 40 S.E. 2d 634, 636 (1946)
in circumstances similar to the principal case, the Court
held that if the defendant and another motorist were
racing, "the act of each ... is, in legal contemplation, the
act of both" so as to warrant the defendant's conviction of
manslaughter. Although no Maryland case in point has
been found, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Duren v.
State, 203 Md. 584, 102 A. 2d 277 (1954), indicated that
speed and lack of control are sufficient grounds to sustain
the proximate cause requirement for the defendant's con-
viction of involuntary manslaughter by automobile even
if the victim's negligence is a concurrent cause. But Mary-
land has not resolved the question whether one driver's
speed can be the proximate cause of another driver's death
where there is no contact between them.
See 99 A.L.R. 756; 8 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTo-
mOwILE LAW AND PRACTICE (Perm. ed. 1951), Sec. 5351. Also
Note, Manslaughter by Automobile, 18 Md. L. Rev. 144
(1958).
Estoppel - Corporate Officer Estopped From Claiming
Ownership Of Property In Himself When By His Conduct
He Has Represented It As Corporate Property. Solomon's
Marina Inc., et al v. Rogers, 221 Md. 194, 156 A. 2d 432
(1959). The defendant, a major stockholder, director, and
officer of the plaintiff corporation, sold the corporation a
boat on credit, with no date set for payment of the purchase
price. Four years later, the purchase price being still un-
paid, the defendant repossessed the boat. Thereupon the
corporation brought an action of replevin to recover the
boat from the defendant. By authorization of the defend-
ant and the other directors the boat had been listed as an
asset and the unpaid purchase price as a liability on the
corporation's balance sheets which were made part of cir-
culars offering common stock and convertible debentures
for sale to the public, the corporation realizing approxi-
mately $400,000 from these sales. In reversing the trial
court's decision that passage of title was conditioned upon
payment of the purchase price, the Court of Appeals held
that one who has induced another to deal with a corpora-
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tion of which he is a stockholder, director and officer by
representing that the corporation is the owner of certain
property, is precluded from denying the truth of the repre-
sentation and from setting up ownership in himself when
the other has relied on this inducement to his detriment.
Where purchasers of stock and debentures of the corpora-
tion relied on the representation they were entitled to have
the boat be part of the corporate assets.
The Court, in so holding, followed a long line of Mary-
land decisions, beginning with Rodgers v. John, 131 Md.
455, 105 A. 549 (1917), which have applied the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. For recent cases following this doctrine,
see Fitch v. Double "U" Sales Corp., 212 Md. 324, 128 A. 2d
427 (1957), Johnson Lumber Co. v. Magruder, 220 Md.
440, 147 A. 2d 208 (1958), and Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 220 Md. 497,
154 A. 2d 826 (1959). See generally 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS (5th Ed.) Sec. 854, and 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (5th Ed.) Sec. 804.
Evidence - A Wife's Statement To Fellow Conspirator
Is Admissible At Trial Of Conspirator-Husband. Common-
wealth v. Garrison, 157 A. 2d 75 (Pa. 1959). Defendant,
his wife and three others joined in a burglary conspiracy
which resulted in the death of the burglary victim. At de-
fendant's trial one of the conspirators was allowed to testify
that defendant's wife had suggested to him that the victim's
house was a good place for a burglary. Defendant con-
tended on appeal that this testimony violated the Pennsyl-
vania statute:
"Nor shall husband and wife be competent or per-
mitted to testify against each other. .. ." 28 PURDON'S
PENNA. STAT. ANNOTATED § 317.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held (5-2), that the
testimony was properly admitted, in spite of the statute,
since the wife did not testify and the information she
gave the testifying conspirator did not refer to the hus-
band. A dissent claimed the majority allowed the very
thing the statute prohibited because the statutory prohibi-
tion extends beyond testimony in court to extra-judicial
admissions "from the mouth of the wife" (79).
Wigmore is in accord with the dissent:
"... it would seem that the hearsay declarations by
the wife or husband, such as would be receivable under
19601
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some exception to the Hearsay Rule, should be ex-
cluded when offered against the other spouse." 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) Sec. 2233.
Cases in accord with the dissent are, Taylor v. State, 220
Ark. 953, 251 S.W. 2d 588 (1952) and Seymour v. State, 210
Ga. 21, 77 S.E. 2d 519 (1953).
Allied with the majority is United States v. Winfree,
170 F. Supp. 659 (D.C. 1959), where extra-judicial state-
ments made to Internal Revenue officers by defendant's
wife were admissible even though the wife would not have
been allowed to testify in court against the husband.
A witness-spouse is competent to testify in Maryland,
4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, Sec. 4, but the statute contains
no words of compulsion and the power to compel a spouse
to testify is open to question. See Moser, Compellability of
One Spouse to Testify Against the Other In Criminal Cases,
15 Md. L. Rev. 16 (1955).
Evidence - Maryland Statute On Admissibility Of
Criminal Conviction Limited In Scope. Gray v. State, 221
Md. 286, 157 A. 2d 261 (1960). Defendant and two others
were convicted of armed robbery. Defendant alone ap-
pealed and upon his conviction being reversed, a new trial
was granted. In the second trial, the State produced testi-
mony to the effect that one of defendant's co-indictees was
sentenced to confinement for ten years for the armed
robbery. The lower court, in convicting defendant, allowed
this testimony on the basis of 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35,
Sec. 11, which states: "If any person . .. charged with
committing any crime is found guilty thereof, such fact
shall be admissible . . . in any proceeding .. .in which
another person .. .shall be charged with committing the
same crime. .. ." The Court of Appeals, in reversing the
lower court, held the admission of this evidence was im-
proper since the statute was intended to apply only where
a person is convicted of a crime which is predicated on the
act of a single person, and subsequently another person
is charged with the same crime. The purpose of such a
statute is to prevent the possibility of two persons being
convicted for a crime that only one could have committed.
In the instant case, however, the crime was predicated on
an offense by joint actors, and the disputed evidence tended
to establish defendant's guilt on the basis of his co-
indictee's conviction.
The instant case is the first construction of this unique
Maryland statute. No other jurisdiction appears to have a
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similar one. The Court recognized the general rule that
where two or more persons are jointly indicted for the
same crime and are tried separately, the conviction or
acquittal of one is inadmissible against the other. 2
WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (12th Ed.) § 439; Hunter v.
State, 193 Md. 596, 603, 69 A. 2d 505 (1949). The Court
then applied the reasoning in Rogan v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., 188
Md. 44, 53, 52 A. 2d 261 (1947), ". . . if the language of a
statute is open to either of two constructions, the court
should adopt that construction which will best tend to
make the statute effectual and produce the most beneficial
results."
See 48 A.L.R. 2d 1016 and 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd
Ed.), Sec. 142.
Mechanic's Lien - Notice To Resident Agent Of Cor-
poration Effective. Jakenjo, Inc. v. Blizzard, 221 Md. 46,
155 A. 2d 661 (1959). Where a mechanics' lien claimant
mailed a registered letter to the corporation containing
notice of intention to claim a lien, the letter being returned
unclaimed, and subsequently he mailed a registered letter
containing the same notice to the resident agent of the
corporation, the Court of Appeals held that the notice to
the resident agent was effective.
The defendant corporation contended that the only
authority of a resident agent is to accept service of process.
The court disagreed, relying on 2 Md. Code (1957) Art.
23, Sec. 99, which provides in part: "Any notice required
by law to be served upon any corporation.., by personal
service upon a resident agent or other agent or officer of
such corporation, may be served upon such corporation
in the manner provided in § 97 of this article.. ." Sec. 97
provides for substituted service upon the State Department
of Assessments and Taxation (successor of the State Tax
Commission). The Court drew the implication from Sec.
99 that under Maryland law a resident agent has authority
to receive statutory notices as well as legal process.
Taxation - A Church Parking Lot Is Not Exempt.
Second Church of Christ Scien. v. City of Philadelphia,
157 A. 2d 54 (Pa. 1959). City real estate taxes were levied
on parking lots of two churches, contiguous to the church
buildings, and used by the congregations attending ser-
vices. Claiming that a parking lot is necessary in this
modern age for the fulfillment of the church's purpose as
a place of worship, the churches sought relief under the
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Pennsylvania tax exemption to churches and the grounds
"thereto annexed for the occupancy and enjoyment of the
same." In denying relief the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the exemption extends only to the actual place
of worship and the grounds required for ingress, egress,
light and air, and that parking is an adjunctive use of the
grounds having no actual connection with the worship.
Although demanding that the exemptions be strictly
construed, Maryland grants tax immunity to places of pub-
lic worship, parsonages, and "the grounds appurtenant"
thereto and "necessary for the respective uses thereof." 7
MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, Sec. 9(4). The Maryland Court of
Appeals, while stressing the "necessary" proviso, has
granted immunity to thirty-five acres on which a taber-
nacle, parsonage, and living facilities for communicants
were constructed to sustain an annual ten-week summer
religious program. Morning Cheer v. Co. Com'rs., 194 Md.
441, 71 A. 2d 255 (1950). In contrast, a similar Pennsylvania
case exempted only the chapel and other sites consecrated to
worship. Layman's Week-End Retreat League v. Butler,
83 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 134 A.L.R. 1185 (1924).
While noting that Maryland gives a less stringent in-
terpretation to its exemption statute than Pennsylvania,
and recognizing that some courts frown upon the strict
interpretation clauses of tax exemption statutes favoring
religious and charitable groups, Kemp v. Pillar of Fire,
94 Colo. 41, 27 P. 2d 1036, 1037 (1933); Trustees of Phillips
Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 27 A. 2d 569
(1940), apparently a distinction is properly drawn between
what is convenient for the congregation and what is nec-
cessary for religious worship. See Congregational Union of
Cleveland v. Zangerle, 138 Ohio St. 246, 34 N.E. 2d 201,
202 (1941). A church parking lot is immune where the
statute exempts property required for "convenient" use.
Immanuel Presbyterian Church v. Payne, 90 Cal. App. 176,
265 P. 547 (1928). The cases are collected in 168 A.L.R.
1222, 1253.
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